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Authentication

Section titled “Authentication”

The Hoody API authenticates users with short-lived JWT access tokens and longer-lived refresh tokens, and supports TOTP-based two-factor authentication. This page covers every authentication surface: PKCE OAuth with GitHub and Google, the RFC-8628-inspired device authorization flow used by the CLI and SSH agents, email-and-password login, email verification, password recovery, session lifecycle (refresh, logout, intent cancellation), current-user introspection, the full 2FA lifecycle (setup, verification, backup-code rotation, token gate, disable), and audience-bound identity-claim issuance. All examples target https://api.hoody.com.

Authenticated requests send Authorization: Bearer <token> (or the long-lived auth token in the same header). Token-gated 2FA actions also accept Authorization: Bearer <refreshToken> and a body code field.

Public endpoints

Section titled “Public endpoints”

GET /api/v1/meta/public-key

Section titled “GET /api/v1/meta/public-key”

Returns the ED25519 public key(s) used by Hoody to sign API responses (the X-Hoody-Signature header), identity claims issued at login, and container authorization claims. The keys[] array is a rotation window: it carries the next prepublished key and the previously retained key alongside the currently active one (matched by active_kid), so verifiers can still validate signatures that were issued before the new key became active. Always look the key up by kid rather than pinning to a fixed key; if a signature or claim references an unknown kid, re-fetch this endpoint. No authentication is required; the endpoint is intentionally public.

Terminal window
curl -s https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/meta/public-key

This endpoint takes no parameters.

{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Hoody API signing public key",
  "data": {
    "keys": [
      {
        "kid": "v1",
        "algorithm": "ed25519",
        "public_key_hex": "8c8d683c125761bd9157e3a6f98c30d81cd7f2be4d16062a8342d1fcd2ca474a",
        "public_key_b64": "jI1oPBJXYb2RV+Om+YwwwlzX8r5NFgYqg0LRzSykd0o=",
        "public_key_b64url": "jI1oPBJXYb2RV-Om-YwwwlzX8r5NFgYqg0LRzSykd0o"
      }
    ],
    "active_kid": "v1",
    "usage": ["response-signing", "identity-claims", "container-claims"],
    "signing_format": {
      "response_header": "t=<unix_ts>,kid=<key_id>,m=<method>,s=<status>,path=<request_url>,sig=<hex>",
      "response_signed_data": "<t>\\n<method>\\n<status>\\n<path>\\n<response_body_utf8_string>",
      "identity_claim_signed_data": "base64url(JSON.stringify(claim_payload)) — the b64url string itself (UTF-8 bytes)",
      "container_claim_signed_data": "base64url(JSON.stringify(container_claim_payload)) — the b64url string itself (UTF-8 bytes)",
      "replay_tolerance_seconds": 300
    }
  }
}

GET /api/v1/auth/available-regions

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/available-regions”

Returns regions where free-tier servers exist, with a boolean availability flag for each. Public, no authentication required.

Terminal window
curl -s https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/available-regions

This endpoint takes no parameters.

{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": {
    "regions": [
      { "region": "eu-west", "country": "DE", "city": "Frankfurt", "available": true },
      { "region": "us-east", "country": "US", "city": "Ashburn", "available": false },
      { "region": "ap-south", "country": "SG", "city": "Singapore", "available": true }
    ]
  }
}

GET /api/v1/auth/config

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/config”

Returns the public sign-in configuration used to drive the OAuth and password flows (for example, which identity providers are enabled and which flows are exposed to the SPA).

Terminal window
curl -s https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/config

This endpoint takes no parameters.

The default response shape is returned.

Identity claims

Section titled “Identity claims”

An identity claim is an ED25519-signed credential that proves “Hoody authenticated this user” to systems outside Hoody. Verifiers validate the signature offline against the public keys published at GET /api/v1/meta/public-key — no round trip to Hoody is needed after the initial key fetch. Claims are returned by:

  • POST /api/v1/users/auth/login (default tokens mode — see Login)
  • POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify (default tokens mode — see Verify 2FA Code During Login)
  • POST /api/v1/auth/verify-email (when response_mode=tokens and signing is configured — see Verify email address)
  • POST /api/v1/auth/device/token (device-flow token mint)
  • POST /api/v1/users/auth/identity-claim (audience-bound re-issuance)

Claims are omitted when response_mode=intent (the hosted auth UI hands off a single-use auth_intent_token to the SPA via PKCE exchange), and omitted when HOODY_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY is not configured on the server. In that case the response just lacks the identity_claim field — call /api/v1/meta/public-key once at startup to determine whether signing is available (a 200 response is the signal).

Bundle format

FieldTypeDescription
kidstringKey identifier; look up the matching key in GET /api/v1/meta/public-key keys[]
payload_b64stringbase64url-encoded UTF-8 JSON containing the payload below
signature_hexstringED25519 detached signature over the UTF-8 bytes of payload_b64 (128 hex chars = 64 bytes)

Payload (payload_b64 decoded)

FieldTypeDescription
claim_typestringAlways "identity"
issstringAlways "hoody-api"
substringUser ID (24-character hex)
usernamestringThe authenticated username at the time of issue
typestring"user" or "admin"
iatintegerIssued-at (Unix seconds)
expintegerExpiry (Unix seconds); default ~30 days
kidstringThe signing key id used; must equal the bundle kid
audstringOptional audience binding (only present on audience-bound re-issued claims)

Mandatory verification checks

A verifier MUST perform all of the following before trusting a claim:

  1. Look the kid up in GET /api/v1/meta/public-key keys[] and obtain the 32-byte ED25519 public key. If the kid is not in keys[], re-fetch the endpoint (key rotation) and try again; reject if still missing.
  2. Verify the signature: nacl.sign.detached.verify(UTF8(payload_b64), hexToBytes(signature_hex), publicKey) returns true. The signed bytes are the UTF-8 bytes of the payload_b64 string itself, not the decoded JSON.
  3. payload.claim_type === "identity".
  4. payload.iss === "hoody-api".
  5. payload.exp > now and payload.exp > payload.iat.
  6. payload.iat <= now + 300 (clock skew tolerance).
  7. payload.kid === bundle.kid and audience semantics are strict both ways: if payload.aud is present, the verifier MUST be that audience AND the verifier’s own identifier MUST be the audience; if payload.aud is absent, the verifier MUST NOT be audience-aware (otherwise reject).
const crypto = require('crypto');


// Public key MUST come from GET /api/v1/meta/public-key keys[] looked up by kid.
// ED25519 SPKI prefix for 32-byte raw keys.
const SPKI_PREFIX = Buffer.from('302a300506032b6570032100', 'hex');


function hexToBytes(hex) {
  return Buffer.from(hex, 'hex');
}


function rawPubkeyToSpki(raw32) {
  return Buffer.concat([SPKI_PREFIX, raw32]);
}


function verifyIdentityClaim({ kid, payload_b64, signature_hex }, publicKeyHex, expectedAudience /* or null */) {
  // 1. kid -> 32-byte raw ED25519 public key
  const rawPub = hexToBytes(publicKeyHex);
  if (rawPub.length !== 32) throw new Error('bad pubkey length');


  // 2. signature over UTF-8 bytes of payload_b64
  const ok = crypto.verify(
    null,
    Buffer.from(payload_b64, 'utf8'),
    { key: rawPubkeyToSpki(rawPub), dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' },
    hexToBytes(signature_hex)
  );
  if (!ok) throw new Error('bad signature');


  // 3-6. payload shape
  const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload_b64, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));
  if (payload.claim_type !== 'identity') throw new Error('bad claim_type');
  if (payload.iss !== 'hoody-api')       throw new Error('bad iss');
  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
  if (!(payload.exp > now))              throw new Error('expired');
  if (!(payload.exp > payload.iat))      throw new Error('exp <= iat');
  if (!(payload.iat <= now + 300))       throw new Error('iat in the future');


  // 7. kid match + strict both-ways audience semantics
  if (payload.kid !== kid)               throw new Error('kid mismatch');
  if (payload.aud) {
    if (!expectedAudience || payload.aud !== expectedAudience) throw new Error('aud mismatch');
  } else if (expectedAudience) {
    throw new Error('audience required by verifier but claim is audience-unbound');
  }
  return payload;
}


// Example claim bundle (decodable; signature is illustrative)
const claim = {
  kid: 'v1',
  payload_b64: 'eyJzdWIiOiI1MDdmMWY3N2JjZjg2Y2Q3OTk0MzkwMTEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFsaWNlIiwidHlwZSI6InVzZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDEyOTAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTc0Mzg4MjAwMCwia2lkIjoidjEifQ',
  signature_hex: 'a'.repeat(128),
};

Gating patterns for proxied applications

There are three ways to gate a proxied application on Hoody authentication, in order of preference:

  1. Native hoody-identity permission group. Add the hoody-identity.authentication permission to the app’s proxy permissions; the edge enforces it before the request reaches the app. See Proxy permissions: hoody-identity.
  2. App-level gate via a NON-RESERVED header. The edge strips any header in the X-Hoody-Identity-* namespace before the request reaches the application — a claim sent there never arrives. Instead, convention is X-Hoody-Claim: &lt;payload_b64&gt;.&lt;signature_hex&gt; carrying a pinned kid. The app looks up the kid in its cached /api/v1/meta/public-key response and runs the seven checks above.
  3. Proxy hook. For per-route policy that isn’t a single permission group, attach an identity_claim_auth_gate hook that performs the same verification on the claim header. See Proxy hooks: identity_claim_auth_gate — that recipe likewise uses the non-reserved x-hoody-claim header.

For container-scoped claims (programs running inside a container that need to authenticate against a third party), see Container claims on the Containers API.

Sign up

Section titled “Sign up”

POST /api/v1/auth/signup

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/signup”

Create a new account with email and password. A verification email is sent; the account is not active until the email is verified.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/signup \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "email": "alice@example.com",
    "password": "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!42",
    "region": "eu-west"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
emailstringYesEmail address for the new account (max 255 chars).
passwordstringYesPassword (min 12, max 128 chars; must include uppercase, lowercase, number, and special char).
regionstringNoOptional preferred server region (e.g. eu-west). Auto-assigned by GeoIP if omitted.
invite_codestringNoOptional invite code from the signup link. Memorized (hash-only) and applied after email verification.
clientstringNoSource channel for analytics: web | ssh | webssh | cli | sdk | agent.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Verification email sent",
  "data": { "email": "alice@example.com" }
}

POST /api/v1/auth/verify-email

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/verify-email”

Verify the email address using the token from the verification email. The default response returns full login credentials (and a identity claim when response_mode=tokens and signing is configured). When response_mode=intent + code_challenge are provided, returns an opaque auth_intent_token for PKCE exchange (hosted auth UI flow). If 2FA is enabled on the account, returns requires_2fa + temp_token instead.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/verify-email \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "token": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
    "response_mode": "tokens"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
tokenstringYesVerification token from the email link (64 chars).
response_modestringNotokens (default — returns access/refresh tokens) or intent (returns an opaque auth_intent_token for PKCE exchange).
code_challengestringNoPKCE code_challenge (base64url SHA-256 of code_verifier). Required when response_mode=intent.
clientstringNoSource channel for analytics.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Email verified",
  "data": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "expires_at": "2025-11-28T20:19:00.000Z",
    "expires_in": 86400,
    "refresh_expires_at": "2025-12-04T20:19:00.000Z",
    "refresh_expires_in": 604800,
    "identity_claim": {
      "kid": "v1",
      "payload_b64": "eyJzdWIiOiI1MDdmMWY3N2JjZjg2Y2Q3OTk0MzkwMTEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFsaWNlIiwidHlwZSI6InVzZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDEyOTAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTc0Mzg4MjAwMCwia2lkIjoidjEifQ",
      "signature_hex": "abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef12"
    },
    "user": {
      "id": "507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
      "username": "alice",
      "email": "alice@example.com",
      "is_admin": false,
      "email_verified": true,
      "signup_method": "email",
      "created_at": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z",
      "updated_at": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z"
    }
  }
}

POST /api/v1/auth/resend-verification

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/resend-verification”

Resend the email verification link. Always returns success to prevent email enumeration.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/resend-verification \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "email": "alice@example.com" }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
emailstringYesEmail address to resend verification to (max 255 chars).
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "If an account exists for that email, a verification link has been sent"
}

Password recovery

Section titled “Password recovery”

POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password”

Request a password reset email. Always returns success to prevent email enumeration.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/forgot-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "email": "alice@example.com" }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
emailstringYesEmail address associated with the account.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "If an account exists for that email, a reset link has been sent"
}

POST /api/v1/auth/reset-password

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/reset-password”

Set a new password using the reset token from the password reset email.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/reset-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "token": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
    "password": "NewSecurePass!42"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
tokenstringYesPassword reset token from the email link (64 chars).
passwordstringYesNew password (min 12, max 128 chars).
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Password reset successful"
}

Login and session management

Section titled “Login and session management”

POST /api/v1/users/auth/login

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/login”

Authenticate with username/email + password to receive a JWT access token (expires in 1 day) and a refresh token (expires in 7 days). Use the access token in the Authorization header for subsequent requests: Authorization: Bearer &lt;token&gt;. The response includes an identity claim when HOODY_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY is configured; in intent mode the response instead carries an opaque auth_intent_token for PKCE exchange (hosted auth UI only). If 2FA is enabled, returns requires_2fa: true plus a temp_token for verify-setup.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "username": "alice",
    "password": "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!42"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
usernamestringConditionalUsername (3-50 chars; alphanumeric, underscores, hyphens).
emailstringConditionalEmail address (max 255 chars; alternative to username).
passwordstringYesAccount password (8-128 chars; must include uppercase, lowercase, and number).
response_modestringNotokens (default) or intent (PKCE exchange).
clientstringNoSource channel for analytics.
code_challengestringNoPKCE code_challenge. Required when response_mode=intent.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Login successful",
  "data": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "expires_at": "2025-11-28T20:19:00.000Z",
    "expires_in": 86400,
    "refresh_expires_at": "2025-12-04T20:19:00.000Z",
    "refresh_expires_in": 604800,
    "identity_claim": {
      "kid": "v1",
      "payload_b64": "eyJzdWIiOiI1MDdmMWY3N2JjZjg2Y2Q3OTk0MzkwMTEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFsaWNlIiwidHlwZSI6InVzZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDEyOTAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTc0Mzg4MjAwMCwia2lkIjoidjEifQ",
      "signature_hex": "abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef12"
    },
    "client_ip": "192.168.1.100",
    "recent_login_ips": [
      { "ip": "192.168.1.100", "timestamp": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z" },
      { "ip": "10.0.0.5", "timestamp": "2025-01-14T09:15:00.000Z" }
    ],
    "auth_token_count": 2,
    "user": {
      "id": "507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
      "username": "alice",
      "alias": "Alice",
      "email": "alice@example.com",
      "is_admin": false,
      "is_banned": false,
      "metadata": {},
      "created_at": "2024-12-01T10:00:00.000Z",
      "updated_at": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z"
    }
  }
}

POST /api/v1/users/auth/refresh

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/refresh”

Exchange a valid refresh token for a new access token and a new refresh token. Send the refresh token in the Authorization header: Authorization: Bearer &lt;refreshToken&gt;.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/refresh \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
refreshTokenstringYesValid refresh token from a previous login or refresh.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Token refreshed successfully",
  "data": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "expires_at": "2025-11-28T20:19:00.000Z",
    "expires_in": 86400,
    "refresh_expires_at": "2025-12-04T20:19:00.000Z",
    "refresh_expires_in": 604800
  }
}

POST /api/v1/users/auth/logout

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/logout”

Log out the current user. Creates an audit log entry. In a stateless JWT setup, the client should also discard the token locally. This endpoint works even for banned users (read-only access).

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/logout \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT"

This endpoint takes no parameters and accepts no request body.

{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Logout successful"
}

POST /api/v1/auth/intent/cancel

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/intent/cancel”

Cancel a pending OAuth AuthIntent or 2FA temp_token. Idempotent. Used by the handoff page when the user dismisses the confirmation.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/intent/cancel \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_INTENT_TOKEN"

This endpoint takes no parameters and accepts no request body.

The default no-content response is returned.

Current user

Section titled “Current user”

GET /api/v1/users/auth/me

Section titled “GET /api/v1/users/auth/me”

Retrieve the profile of the currently authenticated user. Works with JWT, auth token, or HTTP Basic authentication. When authenticated with an auth token, the response includes data.auth_token introspection details (permissions and realm restrictions). This endpoint works even for banned users (read-only access). When authenticated with an auth token that lacks the resources.read_account permission, the response is reduced to identity fields (id, username, alias, public_key, timestamps); email and other account PII are omitted.

Terminal window
curl -s https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/me \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT"

This endpoint takes no parameters.

{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Current user retrieved successfully",
  "data": {
    "id": "507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
    "username": "alice",
    "email": "alice@example.com",
    "alias": "Alice",
    "public_key": "a1b2c3d4e5f6789012345678901234567890abcdefabcdefabcdefabcdef1234",
    "is_admin": false,
    "is_banned": false,
    "email_verified": true,
    "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/1234567",
    "signup_method": "email",
    "free_tier_unlocked": true,
    "free_tier_unlocked_at": "2026-06-24T10:00:00.000Z",
    "free_tier_unlock_source": "invite_code",
    "onboarding": { "hub_tour_v1": "2026-06-30T10:00:00.000Z" },
    "metadata": {},
    "created_at": "2024-12-01T10:00:00.000Z",
    "updated_at": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z",
    "pending_pool_invitations": 0
  }
}

GET /api/v1/users/me

Section titled “GET /api/v1/users/me”

Alias of GET /api/v1/users/auth/me. Same response shape and error model.

Terminal window
curl -s https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/me \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT"

This endpoint takes no parameters.

{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Current user retrieved successfully",
  "data": {
    "id": "507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
    "username": "alice",
    "email": "alice@example.com",
    "alias": "Alice",
    "is_admin": false,
    "is_banned": false,
    "created_at": "2024-12-01T10:00:00.000Z",
    "updated_at": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z"
  }
}

OAuth (browser)

Section titled “OAuth (browser)”

POST /api/v1/auth/authorize

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/authorize”

Begin a PKCE OAuth authorization. Registers a PKCE authorization request (code challenge + redirect URI) and returns a state JWT to drive the browser sign-in flow.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/authorize \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "code_challenge": "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM",
    "redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
code_challengestringYesPKCE code_challenge (base64url SHA-256 of code_verifier; 43 chars).
redirect_uristringYesFrontend URL to redirect to after OAuth completes (must be https://).

The default response shape is returned.

POST /api/v1/auth/exchange

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/exchange”

Complete the PKCE authorization-code flow by exchanging an authorization code and its code verifier for authentication tokens.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/exchange \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "code": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
    "code_verifier": "KbfeC6xCSz8VbEm7o7nK5sXpAhhVxqj1pC8jMlA2oF3sLe1cN0dPqRsTuVwXyZ",
    "redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
codestringYesAuthorization code (64 hex chars).
code_verifierstringYesPKCE code_verifier (43-128 chars).
redirect_uristringYesThe same redirect URI used in the authorization request.

The default response shape is returned.

GET /api/v1/auth/github

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/github”

Redirects the browser to GitHub for OAuth authentication. Browser-only endpoint. PKCE is required post-migration; code_challenge is a required query parameter.

Terminal window
curl -i https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/github \
  -G \
  --data-urlencode "client=web" \
  --data-urlencode "intent=login" \
  --data-urlencode "redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback" \
  --data-urlencode "code_challenge=E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"

Parameters

Section titled “Parameters”
NameInTypeRequiredDescription
clientquerystringNoSource channel for analytics: web | ssh | webssh | cli | sdk | agent. Folded into the signed OAuth state.
intentquerystringNoOAuth intent: login (default). star_check is accepted but ignored (retired).
redirect_uriquerystringYesFrontend URL to redirect to after OAuth completes (must be on an allowed domain).
code_challengequerystringYesPKCE code_challenge (base64url SHA-256 of code_verifier).
invite_codequerystringNoOptional invite code captured from the signup link.

A redirect to the GitHub OAuth provider is returned.

GET /api/v1/auth/github/callback

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/github/callback”

Handles the GitHub OAuth callback. Browser-only endpoint.

Terminal window
curl -i https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/github/callback \
  -G \
  --data-urlencode "code=abcd1234github_code" \
  --data-urlencode "state=eyJhbGciOi..."

Parameters

Section titled “Parameters”
NameInTypeRequiredDescription
codequerystringNoOAuth code returned by GitHub.
statequerystringYesSigned OAuth state JWT returned by /auth/github.
errorquerystringNoProvider-side failure code (e.g. access_denied). Present instead of code when the user declines.
error_descriptionquerystringNoProvider-side error description.
error_uriquerystringNoProvider-side error URI.

A redirect to the frontend after OAuth completes is returned.

GET /api/v1/auth/google

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/google”

Redirects the browser to Google for OAuth authentication. Browser-only endpoint. PKCE is required post-migration; code_challenge is a required query parameter.

Terminal window
curl -i https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/google \
  -G \
  --data-urlencode "client=web" \
  --data-urlencode "redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback" \
  --data-urlencode "code_challenge=E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"

Parameters

Section titled “Parameters”
NameInTypeRequiredDescription
clientquerystringNoSource channel for analytics.
redirect_uriquerystringYesFrontend URL to redirect to after OAuth completes.
code_challengequerystringYesPKCE code_challenge (base64url SHA-256 of code_verifier).
invite_codequerystringNoOptional invite code captured from the signup link.

A redirect to the Google OAuth provider is returned.

GET /api/v1/auth/google/callback

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/google/callback”

Handles the Google OAuth callback. Browser-only endpoint.

Terminal window
curl -i https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/google/callback \
  -G \
  --data-urlencode "code=abcd1234google_code" \
  --data-urlencode "state=eyJhbGciOi..."

Parameters

Section titled “Parameters”
NameInTypeRequiredDescription
codequerystringNoOAuth code returned by Google.
statequerystringYesSigned OAuth state JWT returned by /auth/google.
errorquerystringNoProvider-side failure code (e.g. access_denied).
error_descriptionquerystringNoProvider-side error description.
error_uriquerystringNoProvider-side error URI.

A redirect to the frontend after OAuth completes is returned.

POST /api/v1/auth/launch/initiate

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/launch/initiate”

Initiate OAuth popup-handoff launch. Issues a one-shot launch ticket bound to the request Origin header. The frontend navigates the popup to the returned launch_url, which consumes the ticket and runs the existing PKCE-protected OAuth flow.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/launch/initiate \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "provider": "github",
    "code_challenge": "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM",
    "state_id": "12345678-90ab-4cde-9f01-23456789abcd"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
providerstringYesOAuth provider: github | google.
clientstringNoSource channel for analytics.
code_challengestringYesPKCE code_challenge (43 chars).
state_idstringYesPer-attempt UUID v4 — plumbed through state JWT, cookie name, fragment, message filter.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": {
    "launch_url": "https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/launch/start?ticket=..."
  }
}

GET /api/v1/auth/launch/start

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/launch/start”

Consumes the launch ticket atomically and runs the existing OAuth redirect flow. Sets Referrer-Policy: no-referrer.

Terminal window
curl -i https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/launch/start \
  -G \
  --data-urlencode "ticket=abcd1234launch_ticket"

Parameters

Section titled “Parameters”
NameInTypeRequiredDescription
ticketquerystringYesOne-shot ticket from /launch/initiate response.

A redirect into the PKCE-protected OAuth flow is returned.

Device authorization flow

Section titled “Device authorization flow”

The RFC-8628-inspired device flow lets a CLI or SSH agent prompt the user to authorize the device in a browser. Lifecycle errors are nested under data, not at the response status level.

POST /api/v1/auth/device/code

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/device/code”

Start a device authorization flow. Issues a device_code (polled by the CLI) and a short hand-typeable user_code (shown to the human). Public, no authentication.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/device/code \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "client_name": "Hoody CLI",
    "client": "cli"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
client_namestringNoShown on the verification page as “X is requesting access” (max 64 chars).
clientstringNoSource channel for analytics.
code_challengestringNoOptional PKCE on the device flow itself; if present, the poll REQUIRES the verifier.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": {
    "device_code": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
    "user_code": "ABCD-1234",
    "verification_uri": "https://api.hoody.com/device",
    "verification_uri_complete": "https://api.hoody.com/device?code=ABCD-1234",
    "interval": 5,
    "expires_in": 900
  }
}

POST /api/v1/auth/device/verify_code

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/device/verify_code”

Page-only helper. On a live pending row, mints a one-time device_verify_ticket and sets the __Host-device_verify cookie. Leaks only client_name + coarse status.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/device/verify_code \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "user_code": "ABCD-1234" }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
user_codestringYesThe XXXX-XXXX user code (dashes optional; max 16 chars).
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": {
    "status": "pending",
    "client_name": "Hoody CLI",
    "ticket": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234"
  }
}

GET /api/v1/auth/device/authorize

Section titled “GET /api/v1/auth/device/authorize”

GET endpoint the verification page navigates to. Verifies the provider is fully configured (302 back to the device page with ?error=provider_unavailable, ticket intact, when not), then consumes the device_verify_ticket + __Host-device_verify cookie atomically and redirects to the provider with a server-injected device_binding + attempt nonce. Sets Referrer-Policy: no-referrer.

Terminal window
curl -i https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/device/authorize \
  -G \
  --data-urlencode "ticket=abcd1234ticket" \
  --data-urlencode "provider=github"

Parameters

Section titled “Parameters”
NameInTypeRequiredDescription
ticketquerystringYesThe device_verify_ticket from /device/verify_code.
providerquerystringYesOAuth provider: github | google.

A redirect to the OAuth provider is returned.

POST /api/v1/auth/device/login

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/device/login”

Page-only helper. Verifies email/username + password with full login parity (shared per-account throttle, timing-normalized bcrypt) behind the device_verify_ticket + __Host-device_verify cookie gate. NEVER returns session tokens: no-2FA → {status:"approved"} (tokens mint only at /device/token); 2FA → {requires_2fa, temp_token} (device-bound partial). Credential failures do NOT consume the ticket.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/device/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "ticket": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
    "username": "alice",
    "password": "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!42"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
ticketstringYesdevice_verify_ticket from /device/verify_code (64 hex chars).
usernamestringConditionalUsername (3-50 chars).
emailstringConditionalEmail address (max 255 chars).
passwordstringYesAccount password (8-128 chars).
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": { "status": "approved" }
}

POST /api/v1/auth/device/deny

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/device/deny”

Page-only helper mirroring the RFC-8628 recommendation that the user can deny. Cookie + ticket gated, no credentials required. Flips the pending row to denied; the terminal poll then reports access_denied. An approved row can never be un-approved.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/device/deny \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "ticket": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
ticketstringYesdevice_verify_ticket from /device/verify_code (64 hex chars).
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": { "status": "denied" }
}

POST /api/v1/auth/device/token

Section titled “POST /api/v1/auth/device/token”

Polled by the CLI while the user completes the browser step. Returns 400 with {data:{error}} for lifecycle states (authorization_pending | slow_down | access_denied | expired_token); 200 + token-set on approval. Single-use; also requires the approving user’s session generation to still be current — a password reset / logout-all after approval yields expired_token. The response includes an identity claim when signing is configured.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/auth/device/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "device_code": "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
device_codestringYesThe device_code from /device/code (64 hex chars).
code_verifierstringNoPKCE code_verifier (43-128 chars). Required when code_challenge was supplied to /device/code.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "data": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "expires_at": "2025-11-28T20:19:00.000Z",
    "expires_in": 86400,
    "refresh_expires_at": "2025-12-04T20:19:00.000Z",
    "refresh_expires_in": 604800,
    "identity_claim": {
      "kid": "v1",
      "payload_b64": "eyJzdWIiOiI1MDdmMWY3N2JjZjg2Y2Q3OTk0MzkwMTEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFsaWNlIiwidHlwZSI6InVzZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDEyOTAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTc0Mzg4MjAwMCwia2lkIjoidjEifQ",
      "signature_hex": "abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef12"
    },
    "user": {
      "id": "507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
      "username": "alice",
      "alias": "Alice",
      "email": "alice@example.com",
      "is_admin": false,
      "email_verified": true,
      "signup_method": "email",
      "avatar_url": null,
      "created_at": "2024-12-01T10:00:00.000Z",
      "updated_at": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z"
    }
  }
}

Two-factor authentication

Section titled “Two-factor authentication”

GET /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/status

Section titled “GET /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/status”

Check the current 2FA status for the authenticated user, including whether 2FA is enabled, whether setup is verified, and how many backup codes remain.

Terminal window
curl -s https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa/status \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT"

This endpoint takes no parameters.

{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "2FA status retrieved",
  "data": {
    "enabled": true,
    "verified": true,
    "enabled_at": "2025-01-14T21:00:00.000Z",
    "backup_codes_remaining": 8,
    "require_for_tokens": true
  }
}

POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/setup

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/setup”

Begin 2FA setup. Requires the current password for verification. Returns the QR code for the authenticator app and backup codes. Important: save backup codes securely — they are shown only once.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa/setup \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "password": "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!42" }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
passwordstringYesCurrent account password (8-128 chars).
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "2FA setup initiated",
  "data": {
    "qr_code": "...",
    "manual_entry_key": "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP",
    "backup_codes": [
      "a1b2c3d4e5", "f6g7h8i9j0", "k1l2m3n4o5", "p6q7r8s9t0",
      "u1v2w3x4y5", "z6a7b8c9d0", "e1f2g3h4i5", "j6k7l8m9n0",
      "o1p2q3r4s5", "t6u7v8w9x0"
    ]
  }
}

POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify-setup

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify-setup”

Verify and complete 2FA setup by providing the first code from the authenticator app. This confirms the setup is working correctly. All other sessions are revoked and a fresh token/refreshToken pair is returned (sessions_revoked: true); adopt them to keep the current session alive.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify-setup \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "code": "492039" }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
codestringYes6-digit code from the authenticator app.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "2FA successfully enabled. All other sessions have been signed out.",
  "data": {
    "enabled": true,
    "enabled_at": "2025-01-14T21:00:00.000Z",
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "sessions_revoked": true
  }
}

POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify”

Complete login by verifying a 2FA code. Use the temp_token from the login response and provide either a 6-digit OTP code or a backup code. The response includes an identity claim when HOODY_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY is configured. In intent mode the response instead carries an opaque auth_intent_token for PKCE exchange. In device-flow mode, the partial JWT carries a device_binding, the device row is approved, and NO tokens are issued to the browser.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "temp_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "code": "492039"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
temp_tokenstringNoTemporary token from login response (valid 5 min). May also be sent as Authorization: Bearer.
codestringYes6-digit OTP code from the authenticator app OR 10-character backup code.
response_modestringNotokens (default) or intent (PKCE exchange).
clientstringNoSource channel for analytics.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Authentication successful",
  "data": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "identity_claim": {
      "kid": "v1",
      "payload_b64": "eyJzdWIiOiI1MDdmMWY3N2JjZjg2Y2Q3OTk0MzkwMTEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFsaWNlIiwidHlwZSI6InVzZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDEyOTAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTc0Mzg4MjAwMCwia2lkIjoidjEifQ",
      "signature_hex": "abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef12"
    },
    "user": {
      "id": "507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
      "username": "alice",
      "alias": "Alice"
    }
  }
}

POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/backup-codes/regenerate

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/backup-codes/regenerate”

Generate a fresh set of backup codes; all existing backup codes are invalidated. Requires the current password and a current OTP code. Important: save the new codes securely.

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa/backup-codes/regenerate \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "password": "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!42",
    "code": "492039"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
passwordstringYesCurrent account password (8-128 chars).
codestringYes6-digit OTP code from the authenticator app.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Backup codes regenerated",
  "data": {
    "backup_codes": [
      "a1b2c3d4e5", "f6g7h8i9j0", "k1l2m3n4o5", "p6q7r8s9t0",
      "u1v2w3x4y5", "z6a7b8c9d0", "e1f2g3h4i5", "j6k7l8m9n0",
      "o1p2q3r4s5", "t6u7v8w9x0"
    ]
  }
}

PUT /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/token-gate

Section titled “PUT /api/v1/users/auth/2fa/token-gate”

Enable or disable the OTP requirement for token-mutation operations. Disabling the gate is a security downgrade and therefore requires both password and otp_code as a primary-factor re-authentication.

Terminal window
curl -X PUT https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa/token-gate \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "enabled": true }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
enabledbooleanYestrue = require OTP for token mutations (default), false = skip OTP gate.
passwordstringNoRequired when setting enabled=false (security downgrade requires primary-factor reauth).
otp_codestringNoTOTP code or backup code. Required when setting enabled=false.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Token gate updated",
  "data": { "require_for_tokens": true }
}

DELETE /api/v1/users/auth/2fa

Section titled “DELETE /api/v1/users/auth/2fa”

Disable 2FA for the account. Requires both the current password and a valid OTP code (or backup code) for security. All other sessions are revoked and a fresh token/refreshToken pair is returned (sessions_revoked: true); adopt them to keep the current session alive.

Terminal window
curl -X DELETE https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/2fa \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "password": "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!42",
    "code": "492039"
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
passwordstringYesCurrent account password (8-128 chars).
codestringYes6-digit OTP code from the authenticator app OR backup code.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "2FA successfully disabled. All other sessions have been signed out.",
  "data": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "refreshToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "sessions_revoked": true
  }
}

Identity claim issuance

Section titled “Identity claim issuance”

POST /api/v1/users/auth/identity-claim

Section titled “POST /api/v1/users/auth/identity-claim”

Mint a fresh, audience-bound identity claim for the authenticated caller without requiring a re-login. First-party JWT sessions only — auth tokens, HTTP Basic, and impersonated sessions are rejected with 403. The claim proves “Hoody authenticated this user” to the audience named in the request; third parties verify it offline against GET /api/v1/meta/public-key.

Claim lifetime is clamped to [60, min(server ceiling — default 24h, remaining JWT lifetime)], default 1 hour. When the JWT session has under 60 seconds of life remaining, the server returns 400 REFRESH_REQUIRED so the client refreshes first. Dual rate limits apply (per-IP and per-user).

Terminal window
curl -X POST https://api.hoody.com/api/v1/users/auth/identity-claim \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOODY_JWT" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "audience": "myapp.example.com",
    "expires_in": 3600
  }'

This endpoint takes no path/query/header parameters.

Request body

NameTypeRequiredDescription
audiencestringYesConsumer identifier this claim is bound to (e.g. your app hostname). Printable ASCII, no whitespace or double quotes (1-256 chars). Verifiers reject the claim unless they expect exactly this audience.
expires_inintegerNoRequested claim lifetime in seconds. Clamped to [60, min(server ceiling — default 24h, remaining JWT lifetime)]. Default: 1 hour.
{
  "statusCode": 200,
  "message": "Identity claim issued",
  "data": {
    "identity_claim": {
      "kid": "v1",
      "payload_b64": "eyJzdWIiOiI1MDdmMWY3N2JjZjg2Y2Q3OTk0MzkwMTEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFsaWNlIiwidHlwZSI6InVzZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDEyOTAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTc0Mzg4MjAwMCwia2lkIjoidjEiLCJhdWQiOiJteWFwcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9",
      "signature_hex": "abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef1234abcdef12"
    },
    "expires_in": 3600,
    "expires_at": "2025-11-28T21:19:00.000Z",
    "audience": "myapp.example.com"
  }
}